

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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USIA WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LISBON

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AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 4483

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, YO, UR, XH

SUBJECT: ECPC - INDEPENDENTS' VICTORY OR MUTUEX ACCOMMODATION--
A WESTERN RESPONSE

1. WAS THE ECPC A "TRIUMPH FOR THE ITALIAN, SPANISH AND
YUGOSLAV PARTIES", AND "EMBARRASSING PUBLIC SETBACK FOR THE
SOVIETS" AS WESTERN MEDIA AND OTHERS HAVE REPORTED? OR

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WAS IT "A VICTORY OF REASON, OF AGREEING TO DISAGREE, OF

COMPROMISES ON ALL SIDES, CERTAINLY NO VICTORY FOR TITO"
AS SOVIET EMBOFFS HERE CLAIMED? EQUALLY IMPORTANT WHAT
SHOULD USG AND WEST'S POLICY AND ATTITUDE BE TOWARD
ECPC RESULTS AND OVERALL STATE OF INTER-PARTY RELATIONS?
WE PROPOSE THE WEST EXPLOIT THE DOCUMENT.

2. THE YUGOSLAV PUBLIC REACTION HAS BEEN SATISFACTION MIXED
WITH CAUTION. FIRST MAJOR EDITORIAL, "POLITIKA" JULY 4, STATES
THAT ECPC "AFFIRMED A NUMBER OF POSITIVE PRINCIPLES" AND
"INTRODUCED A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN RELATIONS AMONG PARTIES".
BUT IT WARNS THAT "THE BERLIN MEETING BY ITSELF COULD NOT
AND IT WAS NOT ITS TASK TO ENSURE VICTORY OF NEW APPROACHES..
IT IS NOT EXCLUDED THAT IN PRACTICE IN THE DAYS AHEAD
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE AND ITS DOCUMENT
WILL APPEAR". EDITORIAL ATTACKS TODOR ZHIVKOV AT LENGTH FOR
ALREADY VIOLATING WHAT WAS AGREED TO IN PAREPARATIONS BY CALLING
FOR WORLD CONFERENCE IN THIS ECPC SPEECH AND FOR PUSHING CONCEPT
OF "REAL SOCIALISM" AND "RELATION TO SOVIET UNION AS
TOUCHSTONE OF LOYALTY TO COMMUNISM". WE NOTE BREZHNEV'S
CRITICISM OF CHINESE ALSO A VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT ABOUT
CONDUCT OF CONFERENCE. THUS WHATEVER LICKS INDEPENDENTS
INCORPORATED IN THEIR SPEECHES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MATCHED BY
THOSE OF BLOC--A FACT NOT TO BE IGNORED IN DRAWING UP
BALANCE SHEET.

3. CAUTION AMONG YUGOSLAVS ALSO EVIDENT IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS.
SENIOR FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OFFICIAL TOLD US THAT WESTERN
MEDIA CLAIMS OF INDEPENDENTS' VICTORY WERE HARMFUL, THAT
WHILE YUGOSLAVS FELT CONFERENCE HELD IN NEW ATMOSPHERE THE
PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN DOCUMENT WENT NO FURTHER THAN THOSE
OF 1955 BELGRADE DECLARATION. PARTY SECRETARY OF KEY FOREIGN
AFFAIRS INSTITUTE SAID VICTORY IN ONE BATTLE DOES NOT WIN THE
WAR, THE SOVIETS AND YUGOSLAVS WILL CONTINUE TO BE
IDEOLOGICAL ENEMIES WITH EACH USING DOCUMENT FOR THEIR
OWN PURPOSES. FSFA ASSISTANT SECRETARY BERNARDIC SAW MAJOR
SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFERENCE IN CHANGED BALANCE OF FORCES
WITHIN MOVEMENT BUT WARNED THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT CHANGED
THEIR BASIC APPROACH.

4. ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENT ITSELF JUSTIFIES MODESTY OF
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YUGOSLAV ECPC NEGOTIATOR GRILICKOV'S CLAIM THAT IT
"ACCEPTABLE.. NOT SUCH A DOCUMENT AS WE WOULD HAVE WRITEN
...BUT NOT A DOCUMENT AGAINST THE POLICY OF LEAGUE OF
COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA." POSITIIVE ASPECTS ARE CLEAR AND
ALREADY WELL DOCUMENTED IN THIS AND OTHER EMBASSIES'
REPORTING AND IN WESTERN MEDIA, E.G., PRINCIPLES OF
NON-INTERFERENCE, EQUALITY, INDEPENDENCE, CONSENSUS,
SEPARATE PATHS, PLUG FOR NON-ALIGNMENT, NO MENTION OF

CENTER. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THEM. BUT WHAT HAS RECEIVED LESS ATTENTION ARE AREAS OF NO GAIN, COMPROMISE, OR CONCESSION. THIS IS UNDOUBTEDLY PARTLY CASE AS WESTERN MEDIA AND GOVERNMENTS HAVE GOTTEN MOST OF THEIR INFORMATION ON COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS FROM ITALIAN, ROMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS WHO NATURALLY STRESSED THEIR OPPOSITION TO SOVIETS AND SUCCESSES RATHER THAN AREAS OF GIVE. BQG WITH DOCUMENT NOW AVAILABLE IT IS CLEAR, QGOR EXAMPLE, THAT YUGOSLAVS DID NOT GET THE REFERENCE TO PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES WHICH WAS ONE OF THEIR SEVEN BASIC DEMANDS (SOVIET EMBOFF HERE COMMENTED THAT THIS WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO SOVIETS BECAUSE OF WIDESPREAD

PRESENCE OF CHINESE IN MANY ASIAN COUNTRIES AND ALSO BECAUSE OF "CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR OWN COUNTRY"). SOVIETS ALSO ALLEGED YUGOSLAVS SOUGHT BUT DID NOT GET "STRONGER REFERENCE TO NON-ALIGNMENT" IN THE FINAL BERLIN DOCUMENT. ON KEY QUESTION OF WHETHER EACH PARTY RESPONSIBLE TO ITS OWN WORKING CLASS ALONE OR WHETHER THIS LINKED TO INTERNATIONALIST OBLIGATIONS--THE HEART OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM DISPUTED--SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH FORTY IS AT BEST A COMPROMISE OF INDEPENDENTS' POSITION: "THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIALISM IN ONE'S COUNTRY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF EVERY PARTY TO ITS OWN WORKING CLASS AND PEOPLE ARE LINKED WITH THE MUTUAL SOLIDARITY OF WORKING PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES, OF ALL PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENTS AND PEOPLES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND STRENGTHENING OF INDEPENDENCE, FOR DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM AND PEACE IN THE ENTIRE WORLD". AND PARAGRAPH FORTY-THREE THE FORMULATION CONDEMNING "THOSE FORCES WHICH CONDUCT CAMPAIGNS AGAINST COMMUNIST PARTIES, SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, BEGINNING FROM THE SOVIET UNION.." IMPLIES THE LEADING POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE SECRET

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ONLY COMMUNIST COUNTRY SINGLED OUT IN THE DOCUMENT.

5. THERE ARE OTHER CONCESSIONS AND COMPROMISES THROUGHOUT THE TEXT. PARAGRAPH FOURTEEN CLAIMS THAT EVERYTHING POSITIVE WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD "IS THE RESULT OF THE LONG-TERM STRUGGLE OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST, DEMOCRATIC AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES" WHILE PARAGRAPH FIFTEEN SPECIFICALLY PRAISES "THE FOREIGN POLICY... GROWING INFLUENCE...AND OUTSTANDING ROLE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES"--A CLEAR COMPROMISING OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN INDEPENDENTS' SUPPOSED SUPPORT FOR NATO AND OF NON-ALIGNED YUGOSLAVIA'S ANTI-BOTH BLOCS STANCE. (THUS TITO FELT COMPELLED TO DEVOTE MOST OF FIRST HALF OF HIS SPEECH TO NON-ALIGNMENT TO REFURBISH HIS NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS). SIMILARLY OTHER PARAGRAPHS CITE "COMMON

INTERESTS" AND APPEAL FOR "COMMON ACTIONS" AND "NEW
EFFORTS AND ACTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING SOLIDARITY".
FORMULATION "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT,
REVOLUTIONARY AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES" FIGHTING FOR NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORDER
AS JUXTAPOSED TO CRITICISM OF "IMPERIALIST FORCES" IS

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PRECISELY CONCEPT THAT SOVIETS THROUGH THEIR CUBA PROXY
HAVE BEEN FIGHTING TO INTRODUCE OVER ALLEGED YUGOSLAV OPPOSITION

IN COLOMBO SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS. LANGUAGE OF ECPC DOCUMENT IS THUS FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTUAL CONCESSION ON PART OF YUGOSLAVS WHO HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF DEVELOPED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FOR NOT SHARING DEVELOPMENT BURDEN, AND WHO HAVE RESITED DIVISION OF WORLD INTO TWO, PROGRESSIVE AND REACTIONARY GROUPINGS.

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6. THUS THE WORD "CAPITULATION" DOES NOT SEEM TO FIT SOVIET DECISIONS ON DOCUMENT OR CONFERENCE. THEY HAVE SINCE 1950'S RECOGNIZED ON PAPER AUTONOMY OF NON-BLOC PARTIES. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN LOOKING AT SOVIET "CONCESSIONS" IS RECOGNITION THAT THEIR NEGOTIATING SYTELE IS INITIALLY TO DEMAND WHAT THEY KNOW TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, HOPING THAT THEY WILL THUS GAIN ADDED LEVERAGE ON FINAL RESULT. RATHER THAN THE FLOW OF "CONCESSIONS" ONE SHOULD LOOK AT WHAT THE DOCUMENT ACTUALLY STATES. FROM THAT PERSPECTIVE WE WOULD CALL DOCUMENT A DRAW -- EACH SIDE GIVING BUT ALSO GETTING SOMETHING FOR FUTURE USE AND REALIZING THAT FURTHER DELAY AND NEGOTIATION WOULD GAIN NO MORE.

7. IN ANY CASE FOR THE SOVIETS THE CENTRAL GOAL AND THEIR CENTRAL GAIN HAS ALWAYS BEEN HOLDING THE CONFERENCE RATHER THAN ITS CONTENT. IN THIS SENSE THE "MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE". FOR TITO TO GO TO HIS FIRST PARTY CONFERENCE SINCE THE 1948 BREAK SYMBOLIZES NOT ONLY AUTONOMY BUT UNITY. AS FSFA DIRECTOR FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS STARCEVIC SAID TO US "WHETHER THE UNITED STATES LIKES IT OR NOT, THERE IS A DEGREE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND PARTIES". FOR THE YUGOSLAVS AND OTHER INDEPENDENTS TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE WHOSE DOCUMENT SETS FORTH IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL A COMMON, ANTI-WESTERN EUROPEAN AND EVEN GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY PLATFORM WAS A CLEAR SOVIET ACHIEVEMENT. WE WONDER FOR EXAMPLE WHAT THE CHINESE REACTION MUST BE.

8. A WELL-CONNECTED SOVIET EMBOFF COMMENTED TO US THAT FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE WAS ITS IMPACT ON INTERNAL SOVIET POLICY. ACCORDING TO HIM BREZHNEV HAD CLEARLY COME OUT THE STRONGER AND SUSLOV THE WEAKER. THIS WAS BREZHNEV'S CONFERENCE AND BREZHNEV'S DOCUMENT (THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE LINE DREAMED UP FOR WESTERN EARS). IN THIS SENSE, AS EMBASSY MOSCOW POINTS OUT, ECPC IS PART OF THE "PEACE POLICY" IN EUROPE (BREZHNEV) UNVEILED AT THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS IN 1971. WHETHER IT ADVANCED OR RETARDED THAT POLICY PARTICULARLY

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SOVIET UNION'S "REASONABLE" IMAGE, IS SURELY ONE MEASURE OF THE ECPC'S SUCCESS. AS PARAGRAPHS TWENTY AND TWENTY-TWO STATE "THE STRUGGLE OF ALL ANTI-IMPERIALIST, ANTI-COLONIALIST AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES HAS CONTRIBUTED TO AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE WORLD AND IN EUROPE.....ALL THIS CONTRIBUTES TO THE GROWTH IN INFLUENCE OF SOCIALISM".

9. CY SULZBERGER CAUGHT WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE THE ECPC'S CENTRAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR AMERICAN POLICY WHEN HE WROTE: " THE NEWS FROM EAST BERLIN, THEN, IS NOT THAT THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IS BREAKING UP OR GIVING UP ANY OF ITS HISTORIC OBJECTIVES. IT IS MERELY CHANGING TACTICS AND COULD BECOME STRONGER, AS MOSCOW ITSELF DID WHEN IT EASED UP ON ITS COLD WAR HARANGUES AND SUBSTITUTED THE POLICIES OF DETENTE." GENUINE INDEPENDENCE OF WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTIES FROM MOSCOW IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST. BUT ACCEPTANCE OF THE IMAGE OF INDEPENDENCE WHEN THE REALITY OF SOVIET-CP RELATIONS IS MORE COMPLEX IS A THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS (FOR EXAMPLE KATUSHEV MEETING WITH TITO WHICH CLEARED WAY FOR YUGOSLAV PARTICIPATION AND PERHAPS FOR CONFERENCE ITSELF REPORTEDLY WITNESSED INTENSE SOVIET PRESSURE FOR MORE MILITARY FACILITIES HERE AND POSSIBLY SOME YUGOSLAV GIVE. WE UNDERSTAND THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISSENTION IN LCY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ABOUT TITO'S DECISION TO GO TO CONFERENCE AT ALL.

10. THEREFORE WE RECOMMEND FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF OUR NATO PARTNERS A POLICY OF "CONSTRUCTIVE SCEPTICISM" TOWARD THE ECPC DOCUMENT AND CONFERENCE ITSELF. WE SHOULD EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT SOME DAY THESE PARTIES WILL ACHIEVE GENUINE INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION BUT NOTE THAT THE MEETING IN EAST BERLIN DEMONSTRATED THIS IS STILL A DISTANT GOAL, E.G. LACK OF CRITICISM OF SOVIET EMPIRE IN EASTERN EUROPE, ONE-SIDED ATTACK ON WEST'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES AND SUPPORT FOR SOVIETS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC POINTS IN THE DOCUMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR PERSISTENT QUESTIONS AND EVEN DEMARCHES. FOR EXAMPLE HERE IN BELGRADE WE PLAN TO RAISE PARAGRAPH THIRTY-ONE WHICH IN

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CSCE CONTEXT ACCUSES "REACTIONARIES CIRCLES" OF RESTRICTING "DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS " (SIC*) IN WEST AND UNDERMINING

RESULTS OF HELSINKI BY CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION AND CONFRONTATION -- THIS ONE-SIDED CHARGE IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF YUGOSLAVIA'S PROFESSED BALANCED CSCE APPROACH AND DUTY AS HOST TO THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING NEXT YEAR. EQUALLY THE PARAGRAPH CONDEMNING MULTINATIONALS IS A DIRECT CONTRADICTION OF WHAT SENIOR YUGOSLAV OFFICIALS TOLD SECRETARY SIMON HERE JUST TWO WEEKS AGO. (WE NOTE WITH PLEASURE SOFIA'S 1380 AND 1393 ABOUT DEMARCHES BASED ON ZHLIVKO'S SPEECH).

11. FOR BROADER USE WE RECOMMEND TURNING THEIR OWN WORDS ON COMMUNISTS. THE DOCUMENT CALLS FOR LEGALIZATION OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN TURKEY AND SPAIN, ATTACKS WEST GERMAN LEGISLATION ON COMMUNISTS, STATES THAT "THERE IS A GROWING TENDENCY OF MONOPOLISTIC CAPITAL TO TURN TO REPRESSIVE AND AUTHORITARIAN MEANS OF RULING". WE SHOULD MAKE THE LITMUS TEST OF "INDEPENDENT COMMUNISM" ITS WILLINGNESS TO APPLY THE SAME STANDARDS TO THE EAST, WHERE FROM YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH POLAND AND ON TO THE SOVIET UNION NOT A SINGLE INDEPENDENT NON-COMMUNIST PARTY, NEWSPAPER OR UNION IS ALLOWED TO EXIST. WE CAN FOR EXAMPLE RE-WORD DOCUMENT'S PARAGRAPH EIGHTEEN TO APPLY TO THE EAST "IN THOSE COUNTRIES THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING CLASS IS GROWING EVER STRONGER....THAT STRUGGLE IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE BASIS OF GOVERNING BY MONOPOLISTIC COMMUNISM. FOR EVER BROADER LEVELS OF SOCIETY THE HISTORIC NECESSITY IS BECOMING OBVIOUS OF CHANGING ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP FOR PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY WHICH IS BUILT IN ACCORD WITH THE WILL OF EACH PEOPLE". OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE NON-BLOC PARTIES TO FORCE THEM FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD TO GENUINE INDEPENDENCE, AND IN THE MEANTIME TO SHARPEN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AGM DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

AND MARXIST DICTATORSHIPS.

12. IN SUM WHAT WE RECOMMEND IS AN IDEOLOGICAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. THE DEPARTMENT AND USIA COULD ANALYZE THE DOCUMENT AND CONFERENCE TO DEVELOP A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
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AND PLATFORM FOR THE WEST'S USE. THEN WE COULD STIMULATE THROUGH NATO A BROAD AND PERSISTENT WESTERN CAMPAIGN.
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